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I.   Introduction
Houses are expensive. Consequently, the availability and cost of 
housing finance are critical determinants of how well housing markets 
function around the world. Changes in housing finance mechanisms 
are drivers explaining the dramatic changes in housing markets and 
housing activity seen in industrialized countries in recent years. His-
torically, in many countries, housing finance relied on funds provided 
by local lenders, typically depository institutions. With the develop-
ment of capital markets and mortgage securitization, however, fund-
ing for housing comes from a much broader set of investors, including 
international investors. This paper examines the institutional changes 
in housing finance in industrialized countries over the past 30 years, 
including securitization and new types of mortgage contracts. 
In several countries, most prominently the United States, there has 
been a major shift to financing housing through mortgage-backed se-
curities (MBS). The market structure that supports securitization as 
the predominant funding source for mortgage finance in the United 
States has changed dramatically over time. We describe these changes 
and the related developments of home equity extraction and bor-
rowing, credit scoring, and the development of the subprime market 
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and its recent implosion. We consider how government policy and 
market forces have contributed to these developments.
Housing finance systems have evolved differently across countries, 
although there are elements in common. National institutional fac-
tors remain important and there remains variety in housing finance 
institutions. What accounts for these cross-country differences in 
the structure of housing finance? Is there a process of convergence 
in structure? And how have these changes affected housing afford-
ability? We begin with an international perspective examining these 
issues first broadly and then in the particular cases of Bangladesh, 
Korea, and Australia.
We then turn to the U.S. and consider how the assignment of risks 
associated with mortgage lending has changed as a result of recent 
housing finance innovation, while reflecting on the new stress points 
and implications for financial stability. Finally we consider what are the 
implications for supervisory policies or financial market regulation.
II.   The Housing Finance Revolution: A Global Perspective
Over the past 30 years, housing finance systems in industrialized 
countries have undergone revolutionary change. Historically, hous-
ing finance has been provided by heavily regulated local lenders and 
by government-run entities. Mortgage finance had not been funded 
by international capital flows. Today, integration of housing finance 
into capital markets is a global phenomenon, albeit in varied forms. 
The deregulation of housing finance and its integration into global 
financial markets is occurring throughout the world. Nonetheless, 
the nation-specific historical structures of housing finance have heav-
ily influenced current structures. Housing finance systems can be 
divided into four major types. These include: depository systems, di-
rected credit (including provident funds, raised by payroll taxes and 
contractual savings schemes); specialized mortgage lending (through 
government-regulated or -owned banks or “covered bonds” as de-
scribed below); and, more recently, secondary mortgage market sys-
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The traditional methods of housing finance were constrained by 
government policies that segmented the financing of housing into 
specialized circuits that were cut off from the rest of the economy. 
Through the 1980s even the most market-oriented approach, which 
provided housing finance through a depository system, was heavily 
regulated. For example, in the U.K., housing finance in the early 
1980s was largely funded by building societies that charged below-
market interest rates. Building societies were historically formed by 
co-operatives that pooled savings to finance the purchase of homes. 
With lenders cooperating to set below-market rates on loans, the 
mortgage market was shielded from macroeconomic fluctuations, 
thus making them “intentionally rather unresponsive to market rate 
changes” (Diamond and Lea, 1992). Under these circumstances, in-
stitutions raising capital through market channels, such as commer-
cial banks, could not compete, and so mortgage financing largely 
rested in institutions shielded from market pressures. 
The integration of housing finance into capital markets resulted 
from the deregulation of these cooperatives. The Building Society 
Act in 1986 resulted in these institutions offering competitive bank-
ing services equivalent to that of normal banks in the U.K. Building 
societies were allowed to convert to corporate status, operate as pri-
vate firms and access capital markets via controlled public offerings 
of stock. The Act also made provisions allowing commercial banks to 
offer variable-rate mortgage products to borrowers. The leveling of 
the playing field enabled the larger and more financially integrated 
commercial banks to increase their market share through issuance of 
variable-rate mortgages funded by deposits.1 As a result, specialized 
building societies declined in the U.K., and commercial banks grew: 
Building societies provided 70 percent of mortgage debt outstanding 
in 1980, and by 2000, they were providing less than 15 percent with 
commercial banks providing over 70 percent.2 
Within what was to become the Euro-currency market, mortgage   
finance institutions underwent even greater transformation, given their 
historically greater government involvement. Directed credit supplied 
by  contractual  saving  schemes  and  state-regulated  mortgage  banks   
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example in Spain, until the mid-1980s, the Central Bank controlled the 
housing finance system by setting savings and borrowing rates for local 
savings banks, restricting their investing to public debt and mortgages. 
In addition, the government was the principal originator of mortgage 
loans. But beginning in the mid-1980s, the government lifted its regu-
lations to allow commercial lending institutions to enter the market, 
raise funds through demand deposits, and offer variable-rate mortgage 
loans. In addition, vehicles for securitization were developed, although 
as in the U.K., these remained a limited source of funding. 
Throughout Europe, similar changes were occurring. From heavily 
regulated and rationed systems, modern housing finance emerged with 
funding increasingly supplied through market-oriented commercial 
banks. Even in Germany, where prior to 1980 most funds had been 
provided by heavily regulated or state-owned mortgage banks,3 pri-
vate sector depository institutions—although with a different menu 
of mortgage products as discussed below—predominated by 2000. 
The result has been the explosion of mortgage growth throughout 
Europe as shown in Chart 1, although in some countries the high 
growth rates reflect very low starting levels, as seen in Chart 2. 
Similar changes occurred throughout the industrialized world, in 
formerly socialist and, to some degree, in emerging economies as well. 
The changes that have transformed housing finance have been global 
in scale and are the result of global forces. These include: new tech-
nology, a societal-wide move from government regulation to greater 
market orientation, and the worldwide decline in interest rates. 
Technological innovation has proved instrumental to the changes 
that have swept housing finance. The development of money market 
funds forced the elimination of the constraints of interest rate ceilings, 
providing an alternative investment vehicle largely grounded on highly 
rated, short-term debt securities. As a liquid and highly stable invest-
ment, money market funds first came to fruition in the early 1970s 
with the Reserve Fund in the United States. Such innovation was 
abetted by the dismantling of capital barriers that had once hindered 
cross-border flows. Money flowed out from regulated institutions into 
the new, higher-yield money market accounts, thus diminishing the   
ability to rely on protected savings deposits to fund loan origination. The Housing Finance Revolution  25
Chart 1
Residential Mortgage Debt Outstanding to GDP
Chart 2
Selected Mortgage Market Growth Rates Per Annum
Sources: European Mortgage Federation, Federal Reserve System, Dübel (2004)
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This outflow occurred in episodes of dis-intermediation, which wors-
ened over time. 
An important example of this was the savings and loan (S&L) crisis 
in the U.S. which is further discussed below. Countries such as the 
United Kingdom and elsewhere where variable rates predominated 
avoided similar crises, but nonetheless, rate ceilings were unsustainable. 
Similarly in Europe, this same force undermined contractual savings, 
whose low returns were easily beaten by returns in the money markets. 
The mortgage bank system in Germany, which provided long-term 
mortgage financing through on-the-balance-sheet “covered bonds,” 
was not directly affected by this change.4 Nonetheless, commercial 
banks in Germany also moved to increase their market share by offer-
ing an alternative to the covered-bond-financed non-prepayable mort-
gage, which was the depository financed variable- rate mortgage with 
the option to prepay.
Forces of deregulation operating in many markets throughout the 
world also contributed to the development of commercial banks as 
primary providers of housing finance globally. Governments increas-
ingly recognized that markets could deliver lower-cost financing with 
less rationing. A consensus emerged that the most effective way to in-
crease access to credit and to secure sustainable finance was through 
market-based systems linked to capital markets. This did not neces-
sarily imply securitization. Rather, commercial banks emerged as the 
major mortgage lenders in Europe and in developed Asian econo-
mies as well.5
The third characteristic that linked housing finance to global capi-
tal markets was a major decline in interest rates worldwide. We show 
in Chart 3 average nominal prime interest rates from 1980 to 2004 
for industrialized nations,6 which declined from an average of 15 per-
cent in 1980 to 4.4 percent in 2004.7 This historic decrease has been 
instrumental in achieving lower-cost financing for mortgage lending 
in country after country, which adopted monetary policies to control 
inflation and to enable linkages to global capital flows. The decline 
in the cost of market funding rewarded the move to market-based 
financing. As examples, we depict how mortgage rates have declined The Housing Finance Revolution  27
with government debt yields in Charts 4 and 5, which track these 
series for the U.K. and France over the last 30 years. 
The major consequence of the link, provided by global capital flows, 
to cheap debt is an increased access to financing for homeownership, 
a resulting increase in housing demand, and a surge in housing prices 
in industrialized economies throughout the world. Housing prices 
surged for three decades (through 2004). A sustained price increase 
of this sort across so many economies’ housing markets, which are 
local markets, is highly unusual and perhaps unprecedented. While 
there are specific factors contributing to the run-up in individual 
countries, it is clear from the ubiquity of the price acceleration over 
the past several decades that a common global factor is at work. 
The new factor is the translation of interest rate declines into country 
specific mortgage rate declines. In the 1990s, the integration of segment-
ed mortgage markets into global capital markets generated mortgage rate 
declines that both increased housing affordability and decreased the rela-
tive cost of housing with a resulting boom in housing. 
Chart 6 presents simple regression results for six countries. The   
regressions are specified to find whether nominal interest rates Granger 
Chart 3
Global Average Interest Rate and House Price Index 
Sources: Bank for International Settlements House Price Index, Interest Data from U.N. Statistical Database 
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Chart 4 
Treasury Yields and Mortgage Rates
United Kingdom
Chart 5 
Treasury Yields and Mortgage Rates 
France
Sources: Global Financial Data; V. Morgan, Studies in British Financial Policy, 1914-1925: Central Statistical Of-
fice, Annual Abstract of Statistics, London: CSO (1924-); Bank of England, Quarterly Bulletin
Sources: Global Financial Data; League of Nations, Monthly Statistical Bulletin, Geneva: League of Nations (1936-
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cause changes in house prices.8 In all cases, the sign on the interest   
coefficient is negative, and in two cases, it is significant at the 95 percent 
confidence level. A pooled regression for the full set of countries shown 
in Chart 6 is significant at the 99 percent confidence level. While these 
are nothing more than stylized facts, they are consistent with declining 
nominal interest rates driving house price appreciation. This suggests 
that the erosion of rationing and lending constraints is tied to high 
nominal rates. Interestingly, no relationship is found between real in-
terest rates and house prices (Kim and Wachter, 2007).9 
Of course, supply elasticity is the key factor in housing price appre-
ciation resulting from interest rate declines. While lower mortgage 
rates improve housing affordability, they also increase demand. In 
the presence of supply constraints, this increase in demand results 
in housing asset price appreciation, which partially offsets the af-
fordability benefit of the lower interest rates. Though we have no 
direct data on supply constraints in Europe, it is notable that there 
are systematically higher rates of house price appreciation rates in cit-
ies (where supply of developable land is limited) relative to national 
rates of increase (Kim and Wachter, 2004). There is also evidence 
Chart 6 
Interest Rate Coefficient on Simple Granger  
Causality Regressions 
Country Interest rate  
coefficient, C(3)
St. Error t-statistic
Pooled (1980-2004) -0.46 0.12 -3.87
Australia (1986-2004) -0.40 0.49 -0.81
Belgium (1991-2004) -0.02 0.28 -0.07
Canada (1980-2004) -0.42 0.29 -1.48







Note: Regression is P – P(-1) = C(1) + C(2)*(P(-1) – P(-2)) + C(3)* I(-1), where P is house price level and I is 
nominal interest rate. 
Source: BIS Price Data 30  Richard K. Green and Susan M. Wachter
in the U.S. that housing price increases occurred disproportionately 
on the two coasts, where supply is more limited.10 Thus, in the U.S., 
mortgage rate declines have resulted in very different affordability 
outcomes across markets.11 
There is also the possibility that price acceleration, initiated by one-
time mortgage market innovations that increase demand, may go 
beyond levels justified by fundamentals. If homeowners understand 
that declines in interest rates and mortgage innovation are one-time 
events, then the changes will lead to stable and higher equilibrium 
house prices. However, if expectations about future house prices are 
based on observed ex post house price changes, bubbles can emerge 
(Malpezzi and Wachter, 2005; Case and Schiller, 1989).
Magnifying the impact of declining interest rates is the current 
ubiquity of adjustable-rate mortgages (ARMs), which move with 
lower-cost short-term interest rates. Mortgages, around the world, 
range from short-term, bullet loans due every three years, as in Ko-
rea, to mortgages where upward increases are at the discretion of the 
banks, in the U.K., to mortgages which roll over every five years with 
funding, but not interest rates guaranteed, as is the case in Canada. 
Volatility concerns surrounding the use of variable-rate mortgages 
have led to a movement by governments to implement the intro-
duction and growth of securitization.12 Securitization and growth in 
market share of longer-term fixed-rate mortgages (FRMs) are being 
encouraged by government entities to mitigate households’ exposure 
to interest rate risk and the resulting house price and macroeconomic 
volatility. Nonetheless, securitization has not been widely adopted 
and variable-rate mortgages remain pervasive. As discussed below, 
banks may have little interest in raising capital to offer alternatives 
to the variable-rate mortgage.13 Moreover, the current securitization- 
related subprime crisis in the United States may raise doubts about 
the viability of housing finance systems grounded in securitization, 
also further discussed below.
To consider whether housing finance systems will converge to sys-
tems centered on bank-funded ARM-lending or on capital market- 
based, securitization-backed longer-term mortgages, we examine in 
more detail the current transition in public sector and specialized   The Housing Finance Revolution  31
housing financing institutions across several non-European countries. 
In the following, we trace developments in three countries: Bangladesh,   
Korea, and Australia. Even Bangladesh illustrates how mortgage mar-
kets are being transformed, despite the fact that mortgage markets 
are still small there. Nevertheless, the mortgage market is increasingly 
reliant on private sector institutions and privately held banks. In Ko-
rea, an economy that is now the tenth largest in the world, mortgages 
are currently funded almost entirely through private depository in-
stitutions that have evolved to replace government entities. These 
countries illustrate the most common evolution pattern in both Asia 
and in Europe, which is relying on depositories, instead of the securi-
ties market, for mortgage funding.
An exception is the Australian market, where securitization has be-
come an important channel for mortgage finance. It remains an out-
lier, but provides an illustration of how a large asset-backed securities 
market can develop. 
The outcome of these differing trends for global capital markets 
will be strongly impacted by the direction taken by the fast emerg-
ing economies of China and India. The shift from public interven-
tion (in the form of state-owned enterprises) to private finance in the 
mortgage market is being replicated in India and even more strongly 
in China. The shape housing finance systems will take in these two 
countries will, in turn, be influenced by developments elsewhere, 
particularly in Asia. 
The Mortgage Revolution in Bangladesh
Bangladesh has one of the least sophisticated financial institutions 
of any country in the world. While it has a banking sector, it is only 
recently that private banks have developed; it also has nearly non-
existent pensions and insurance sectors. Yet despite these primitive 
conditions, the housing finance sector in Bangladesh has changed 
materially recently, and these changes are consistent with those con-
templated by the Washington Consensus.14
For many years, the principal housing lender in Bangladesh was 
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government-owned mortgage institution. As recently as 2001, nearly 
half the par value of mortgages in Bangladesh was held by BHBFC. 
This heavily subsidized institution also did business outside of the 
mortgage market, and as such, had little incentive to make good 
lending decisions.
BHBFC was funded by the Bangladesh Treasury, with a cost of 
funds of 5 percent per year, an amount well below the market rate 
of interest. Mortgages were managed administratively, rather than 
financially: Bureaucrats originated and serviced mortgages through 
rules (some formal, others not) instead of through market-tested un-
derwriting guidelines. This led to all manner of inefficiencies. First, 
BHBFC approval times were exceptionally long—sometimes as much 
as a year from application to approval. Second, because mortgages car-
ried below-market rates of interest and were essentially granted by the 
government, they were allocated via rationing, rather than underwrit-
ing. The allocation process was often political, rather than financial. 
Third, because BHBFC was for many years not held to general perfor-
mance standards, the agency had little incentive to service loans, and 
so loan performance was poor. Typically, 20 percent of loans would be 
in arrears. When BHBFC did foreclose, it would typically collect less 
than 50 percent of the outstanding loan balance.
The most important thing the Bangladesh government did to be-
gin the mortgage finance revolution in Bangladesh was to stop di-
rectly funding BHBFC. The corporation does still retain a number 
of advantages—it gets a tax exemption, has much more lax capital 
requirements than other financial institutions in Bangladesh, and has 
its bonds guaranteed by the national government. But since it has 
lost its direct government funding, its mortgage volume has stagnat-
ed, and its market share of mortgage debt outstanding dropped from 
48 percent to 40 percent in just the period from 2001 to 2003.
About one-quarter of this loss in market share was filled by nation-
ally owned banks, which were subject to many of the same perverse 
incentives as BHBFC. However, three-quarters of the change in mar-
ket share was filled by private sector institutions, including privately 
held banks and private housing finance corporations (HFCs).The Housing Finance Revolution  33
What is remarkable is that these private corporations (especially 
Delta BRACK housing finance and IDLC) were able to gain a toehold 
in the Bangladesh mortgage market despite a huge disadvantage in   
“cost-of-funds.  For  example,  in  June  2003,  public  sector  financial   
institutions had a cost of funds of less than 5 percent, while private 
commercial banks had a cost of funds of nearly 8 percent and housing 
finance corporations had a cost of funds of 12 percent. Yet, these private 
banks and HFCs were able to take business away from government-
owned institutions because they operated with far more efficiency. 
Delta BRACK and IDLC are particularly interesting stories. Manage-
ment at these institutions worked to develop underwriting standards 
for mortgages which are consistent with practices in the developed 
world. Borrowers are required to put substantial equity (typically 25 
percent) into their houses, and must meet payment ratio requirements. 
The HFCs also attempted developing standards for evaluating poten-
tial borrowers’ credit histories, having inferred from other countries’ 
experiences that past history of bill payment is a strong predictor of 
future payment.
HFCs also pay far more attention to servicing than their government-
owned counterparts; in particular, HFC management maintains that 
threatening to foreclose is an effective mechanism for getting borrowers 
to continue on-time payment, or to redeem themselves quickly should 
they fall behind on their payments. Foreclosure laws in Bangladesh are 
rather weak, and it is questionable as to whether lenders would succeed 
in reclaiming property quickly and efficiently. Because of this, the HFCs 
do two things to protect their assets: They insist on holding titles until 
mortgages are retired, and they are aggressive about making borrowers 
aware when their payments are deficient. 
While HFCs are still a small part of the housing finance system in 
Bangladesh, they are examples of the worldwide revolution in hous-
ing finance. They treat housing finance decisions as a business matter 
rather than an administrative matter; they use an empirical founda-
tion for making underwriting decisions, and they are as aggressive as 
possible about curing deficient loans. Again, what is remarkable is that 
HFCs are able to attract borrowers even though their cost-of-funds is 
substantially higher than their government-guaranteed competitors.34  Richard K. Green and Susan M. Wachter
Executives from IDLC maintained in 200415 that lack of capital 
prevented more rapid growth in Bangladesh. The country is ham-
pered by a lack of access to long-term capital markets; and it does 
not have long-term savings vehicles, such as pension funds and life-
insurance companies. At the same time, the banking system, until re-
cently, has been entirely nationalized. So while Bangladesh has taken 
some important steps in redeveloping a more rationalized and effi-
cient mortgage system, until its financial institutions become more 
mature in general, there were be limits to how much housing finance 
can develop.
The Mortgage Market in Korea
While South Korea’s economy grew rapidly between the end of the 
Korean War and the middle 1990s, the sophistication of its mort-
gage market did not. Overall, the mortgage market was largely in the 
hands of two government institutions: the Korea Housing Bank and 
the National Housing Fund.16 Conventional depository institutions 
were not interested in holding mortgages, because the regulatory re-
gime held mortgage interest rates below short-term market interest 
rates. On the other hand, households could only obtain mortgages if 
they placed deposits in one of the two housing institutions, both of 
which paid below-market interest rates. 
The upshot of these factors was stunted development of the Ko-
rean mortgage market. Borrowers had to wait in a queue before be-
coming eligible to receive a very low loan-to-value ratio loan. This, 
in turn, led to a very low Mortgage Debt Outstanding-to-GDP ratio 
compared with other small markets—in the early 1990s, the ratio of 
the number of households to the number of housing units in Korea 
was roughly two-to-one.
The  1998  Asian  financial  crisis  gave  the  Korean  government   
motivation to initiate reforms17 including the development of a more 
market-driven mortgage market. And as Bank of Korea data demon-
strate, both the consumer credit market in general and the mortgage 
markets in particular have grown quite rapidly in the aftermath of 
these reforms (see Chart 7).The Housing Finance Revolution  35
But the Korean mortgage system now very much resembles the 
U.S. system before the Great Depression. Loans generally have very 
low loan-to-value ratios, variable rates of interest, and balloon pay-
ments. Mortgages in Korea are still financed almost entirely through 
depositories, rather than capital markets. Some policymakers in Korea 
believe that securitization is necessary for mortgages there to become 
more like their counterparts in other parts of the world. The Korean 
government has a set of schemes, such as the Korean Mortgage Cor-
poration (KOMOCO), to securitize mortgages, and although there 
is growth recently in the use of longer-term mortgages backed by 
securitization, ARMs still predominate. 
The  various  European  mortgage  systems,  however,  suggest  that   
securitization is not the magic bullet for the creation of a viable solu-
tion. As discussed above, countries with robust mortgage systems have 
variations in the market share of ARMs. The United Kingdom relies 
almost exclusively on ARMS, while Germany relies heavily on longer-
term FRMs. And as we have seen, the U.K. system is funded almost 
exclusively through deposits to banks while the German system is 
funded by covered bonds as well. Both systems work, although the 
homeownership rate in the U.K., at 68 percent, is substantially higher 
Chart 7
Growth of Mortgage and Consumer Credit 
Korea
Source: Bank of Korea
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than it is in Germany, where it is 40 percent (International Union 
for Housing Finance, 2005).18 Thus, these are two models of a viable 
mortgage system, each with its risks. A third model, also with its own 
risks, is to rely on securitization through collateralized MBS, as Korea 
has attempted and as Australia has accomplished, as discussed in the 
following section.
The Australian Asset-Backed Security Market19 
The Australian asset-backed security (ABS) market has grown rap-
idly over the past decade and is now one of the largest ABS markets 
in the world. As of March 2007, Australian entities’ ABS outstand-
ing amounted to $215 billion, up from $18 billion a decade earlier. 
Roughly $138 billion of these ABS are issued in Australia, with the 
remaining $77 billion issued offshore.20 
ABS were first issued in Australia by the New South Wales and the 
Victorian government housing agencies in the mid-1980s. However, 
the ABS market really started to develop in 1994, when specialist mort-
gage lenders entered the Australian mortgage lending market. These 
lenders relied on residential mortgage-backed securities (RMBS), rath-
er than deposits, to fund their housing loans. Three factors allowed 
specialist mortgage lenders to enter the Australian mortgage market:
First, in the early 1990s, banks’ interest margins on housing loans 
were a very high 4¼ percentage points (Chart 8). High interest mar-
gins and very low default rates meant that housing loans were very 
profitable.21 The bank bill rate, which is the benchmark interest rate 
for most floating-rate bonds in Australia, stabilized in the early to 
mid-1990s at an interest rate that was well below this housing rate 
(Chart 9). The decrease in the bank bill rate was largely due to the 
sharp fall in the inflation rate in Australia and provided specialist 
mortgage lenders with stable and predictable funding costs.
Second,  Australian  and  overseas  banks  without  large  mortgage 
lending  operations  in  Australia  were  willing  to  provide  specialist 
mortgage lenders with wholesale lending facilities and help them   
develop their securitization procedures.The Housing Finance Revolution  37
Chart 8 
Australia Banks’ Housing Interest Rates
Chart 9
Bill Rate and Housing Rates 
Australia
Source: Reserve Bank of Australia
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Finally, Australia’s managed funds industry was growing rapidly, 
mainly due to the introduction of compulsory superannuation in the 
late 1980s. These institutional investors had a healthy appetite for 
highly rated debt (including ABS).22
During the late 1990s, banks and other deposit-taking institutions 
started to issue reasonable quantities of RMBS. Regional banks, in 
particular, have significantly increased their issuance of RMBS be-
cause their housing lending has been growing rapidly and securitiza-
tion is a cost-effective source of funding.
Comparison of ABS Markets in Australia and Asia 
In Australia, the securitization market developed within a year or 
two of the issuance of ABS becoming profitable. The ABS market 
was developed by specialist mortgage lenders in conjunction with 
a few banks that did not have large mortgage lending operations in 
Australia. These entities were keen to exploit the supernormal profits 
earned on housing loans. 
ABS issuance is growing, although slowly, in many countries in 
Asia, off of a low base. Given government encouragement in many 
of these countries, the relevant question may be “why aren’t Asian se-
curitization markets growing more quickly” rather than “why did the 
securitization market develop in Australia.” Possible factors inhibiting 
growth in securitization in Asia include: ample liquidity and the re-
sulting relatively low interest margins on housing loans in the banking 
system of some countries; resistance on the part of domestic banks in 
other countries where interest margins are high; and a lack of good 
data on mortgage default and prepayment rates available to potential 
securitizing institutions, which inhibits their underwriting of ABS. 
Next, we turn to the U.S. case, a country where the housing finance 
revolution has led to a predominant reliance on securitization.
III.   The Mortgage Revolution in the U.S.
Home mortgages have become an increasingly large part of Ameri-
can household balance sheets. In 1949, mortgage debt was equal to 
20 percent of total household income; by 1979, it rose to 46 percent The Housing Finance Revolution  39
of income and to 73 percent of income by 2001 (Mischel, Bernstein, 
and Boushey, 2003). Similarly, mortgage debt was 15 percent relative 
to household assets in 1949, but rose to 28 percent relative to house-
hold assets by 1979 and 41 percent of household assets by 2001. 
This enormous growth of American home mortgages (as a percent-
age of GDP), as shown in Chart 10, has been accompanied by a 
transformation in their form, such that American mortgages are now 
distinctively different from mortgages in the rest of the world. In 
fact, Cho (2004) shows that the growth in Mortgage Debt Outstand-
ing in the United States has closely tracked the mortgage market’s 
increased reliance on securitization. 
The structure of the modern American mortgage has changed sub-
stantially over time. The U.S. mortgage before the 1930s would be 
nearly unrecognizable today: It featured variable interest rates, high 
down payments, and short maturities. In fact, before the Great De-
pression, homeowners typically renegotiated their loans every year. 
The ignition of inflation in the later 1960s and 1970s altered the 
ability of depositories to fund long-term, FRMs: Inflation pushed up 
nominal interest rates and eroded the balance sheets of depositories 
that funded FRMs. Depositories found themselves in a straitjacket 
due to Regulation Q, a federal rule that placed a ceiling on the rate 
that depositories could pay depositors. As nominal interest rates rose, 
depositories could not match what the market was paying for large-
scale investors on U.S. Treasury securities (assets backed by the full 
faith and credit of the United States which pay a market rate of in-
terest). Moreover the major factor (as described above), operating in 
both the U.S. and elsewhere to limit the ability of depositories to fund 
FRMs was the rise of new, competing savings vehicles, such as money 
market funds, mutual funds, and pension funds, which paid higher 
rates than depositories and were also accessible to small savers.23 
The result of the ignition of inflation and the new savings vehicles 
was an outflow of funds. This led to a crisis in the S&L industry, a 
major structural change in U.S. mortgage markets, and ultimately a 
transformation of the housing finance system.24 Legislation respond-
ed to the new environment and removed deposit ceilings and allowed 
thrifts to invest in ARMs.25 40  Richard K. Green and Susan M. Wachter
Chart 10
Mortgage Debt as a Percent of GDP 
United States
Source: Federal Housing Finance Board 
For a time in the late 1970s and early 1980s, when many pundits 
were projecting massive and variable inflation for years to come, it 
even appeared that the FRM might become an historical anoma-
ly and that the U.S. mortgage market would return to the ARMs 
common before the 1930s. In a highly volatile inflationary context, 
FRMs become exorbitantly costly, effectively eliminating their mar-
ket (Chart 11). 
The First U.S. Mortgage Revolution
One cannot grasp the modern housing finance revolution without 
considering the revolution of the 1930s—the revolution in which 
the long-term, self-amortizing, FRM was born. 
Before 1933, the typical first-lien mortgage in the United States 
had a short-term, a variable rate of interest, and a loan-to-value ratio 
of 50 percent or less. Mortgages usually had no amortization, and 
consequently required a balloon payment at the end of the mortgage 
term, which was usually something less than five years. Mortgages 
were funded by two types of lenders: S&Ls, which were local mutual, 
depository institutions; and mortgage bankers, who acted as brokers 
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the 19th century, loans were often funded by life-insurance compa-
nies, and for some insurance companies, such as Northwest Mutual 
Life Insurance, farm and home mortgages were the principal reposi-
tory for investment.26
Lenders set mortgage terms to insulate themselves from risk. The 
variable interest rate protected depository institutions from fluctu-
ations in interest rates, and the low loan-to-value ratios protected 
them from credit risk. But the bullet payment feature created a prob-
lem for  borrowers when unemployment rose and bank liquidity fell 
during the Great Depression. As Bernanke and Gertler (1989) note, 
periods of price deflation, such as the Great Depression, create par-
ticular problems for debt holders, as interest rates cannot fall below 
zero. At the time mortgages came due in the early 1930s, with prices 
declining, real interest rates were very high, which exacerbated the 
fall in house prices. At the same time, the nominal value of outstand-
ing debt remained unchanged, so loan-to-value ratios effectively rose. 
This led financial institutions to avoid extending credit to borrowers 
wishing to refinance. Borrowers therefore had to sell their houses to 
pay off their mortgages, which led to a flood of houses on the market, 
which further depressed prices. Borrowers who couldn’t sell defaulted 
and lenders foreclosed and then sought to sell in order to raise liquid-
ity. This weakened the market even further.
Chart 11
ARMs as a Percentage of All Loans
United States
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To restore liquidity to the mortgage market, New Deal Housing   
Finance  legislation  created  the  Federal  Housing  Administration 
(FHA) to insure long-term mortgages and created the Home Owners 
Loan Corporation (HOLC, and its successor, the Federal National 
Mortgage Association) to tie the mortgage markets to capital mar-
kets. Green et al. (2007) notes:
The HOLC, backed with the full faith and credit of the 
U.S. Government, raised money in the bond market to 
purchase non-performing mortgages from depository in-
stitutions. They reinstated the loans as 20 year fixed pay-
ment mortgages (Green and Wachter, 2005). One could 
look at this as the first example of mass “loan modifica-
tion.”  Borrowers were relieved from an impossible position 
(where they had to raise a large amount of cash to pay off 
a mortgage balance) and placed in a manageable position. 
At the same time, by changing the terms of the loans, the 
federal government reduced the risk embedded in them, 
and therefore increased their value to depositories,27 who 
ultimately bought them back from the HOLC.
While  the  government’s  intervention  in  the  credit  market  was 
successful, one could also argue that the success arose in part from   
extraordinarily  good  timing.  FHA  was  created  after  the  housing   
market had cratered, and after the general price level had fallen about 
as much as it was going to fall. Bureau of Labor Statistics data (2007) 
report that the consumer price index fell by 22.8 percent between 
January 1930 and January 1934, but rose by 7.5 percent between 
January 1934 and 1938. 
Nevertheless, New Deal housing finance legislation created two 
important precedents: the direct intervention of the federal govern-
ment in the U.S. housing finance market, and the creation, within 
the United States, of long-term, self-amortizing, FRMs with relatively 
high loan-to-value ratios.The Housing Finance Revolution  43
Antecedents and Fomenters of the Current Mortgage Revolution
Market Conditions
The “first” modern mortgage system in the United States lasted 
from the New Deal era through the 1970s. Under this system, the 
principal source of mortgage finance was local S&Ls; during the 
1970s, more than half of home mortgage debt outstanding was held 
by S&Ls (Chart 12). 
These institutions were heavily regulated and federally insured. As-
sets held by S&Ls were largely restricted to home mortgages on prop-
erties within a fifty-mile radius of the institution. This geographical 
limitation was supposed to ensure that lenders had “local expertise” 
in underwriting mortgages. More generally, mortgage underwriting 
Chart 12 
Mortgage Holdings by Institutional Type
United States
Source: Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, Table 1173. 
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was based at least in part on relationships, and as such, was quite dif-
ferent from the empirically based metrics that are the foundation of 
prime mortgage underwriting today.
Liabilities, for S&Ls, were deposits whose interest rates were lim-
ited by a ceiling extended to S&Ls in 1966 and removed in 1986 
by the Monetary Control Act of 1980. Depositors were protected 
by the full faith and credit of the United States government through 
the  Federal  Savings  and  Loan  Insurance  Corporation  (FSLIC).28   
Finally, S&Ls could receive advances from a Federal Home Loan Bank 
at below-market rates of interest to finance mortgages. They were   
required to hold regulatory capital of 5 percent, although the defi-
nition of capital was not particularly rigorous. Federal government 
supervisory staff for S&Ls was fairly small and poorly paid, so that 
competent examiners would move from S&L supervision to bank   
supervision, where work was more interesting and pay was better.
Before the late 1960s, the S&L system worked quite well for the 
United States. While supervision was lax, the inability of S&Ls to do 
anything other than make mortgage loans largely prevented moral 
hazard. The S&L Charter also gave S&L management a franchise 
worth protecting—the ability to borrow at below-market interest 
rates29 to fund market rate mortgages. This meant that S&Ls were 
steadily, if not spectacularly, profitable.
Favorable  macroeconomic  conditions  helped  the  system  work. 
Nominal interest rates remained low, and perhaps just as impor-
tant, the yield curve sloped upward at almost all times before 1966 
(Chart  13).  Before  the  1980s,  mortgages  were  overwhelmingly   
long-term  fixed-rate  products,  subject  to  substantial  interest  rate 
risk. As Fisher and Van Order (2006) put it, “the institutions were 
not allowed to originate “balloon” mortgages, which had caused the   
Depression-era wave of foreclosures. Through its provision of uni-
form underwriting standards for the provision of mortgage insurance, 
FHA made the long-term fully amortizing loan with a fixed rate of 
interest (FRM) ubiquitous in the U.S. starting in the 1930s.30 
So long as interest rates remained stable (and so long as the yield 




































































































































































10-Year to One-Year Treasury Spreads: 1953–2007
on profitability—or at least on solvency. But a hint of problems to 
come arose in 1966, when the yield curve turned and remained 
negatively sloped for more than a year (specifically December 1965 
through February 1967). During this time, some S&Ls became in-
solvent, and all faced dis-intermediation problems. Changing macro-
economic conditions revealed an unsustainable regulatory regime.
 In 1968, the Federal National Mortgage Association (FNMA) 
was divided into two pieces: the Government National Mortgage 
Association, known as Ginnie Mae, and the “new” FNMA, known 
as Fannie Mae, which was now privately held and able to buy and 
sell  non-government-backed  mortgages  to  raise  additional  funds 
for mortgages. Congress’ intent with the creation of Ginnie, the 
new Fannie, and Freddie Mac, the Federal Home Loan Mortgage 
Corporation created in 1970 to assure S&Ls always had adequate 
liquidity, was at least partly to ensure that the mortgage liquidity 
problems of 1966 would never happen again.31 In fact, the federal   
charters granted to Fannie and Freddie required them to promote   
liquidity and stability in the secondary market for mortgages as well   
Chart 13 
Yield Curve, Treasury Spreads  
United States
Source: U.S. Federal Reserve 46  Richard K. Green and Susan M. Wachter
as to provide mortgage credit throughout the nation. These institu-
tions would, in turn, bring uniformity to the mortgage market and 
invent financial instruments—derivatives of MBS—that would help 
keep the mortgage market liquid for the entire period from the mid-
1980s to today. 
At the same time, some S&Ls attempted to deal with the problem 
by issuing ARMs, and by 1969, around 19 percent of new mortgages 
did have floating rates. It was not actually clear, however, whether 
they were permitted to make such loans. The Federal Home Loan 
Bank did not believe that S&Ls could do so, and so promulgated 
a rule preventing payments from ever rising over the life of a loan 
(Fisher and Van Order, 2006). By effectively barring ARMs, the Fed-
eral Home Loan Bank Board prevented S&Ls from managing mar-
ket risk, and removed incentives to learn more sophisticated balance 
sheet management. 
The problems of the 1960s were minor when compared to the 
late 1970s. Double-digit inflation produced double-digit long-term 
interest rates, and recessionary expectations led to a sharply negative 
yield curve. S&Ls became substantially insolvent. In an environment 
where the one-year Treasury rate rose to 15.06 percent, the present 
value of a mortgage with a 7 percent coupon rate and a ten-year ex-
pected life fell to 28 percent less than par. Additionally, the minimum 
capital requirement for S&Ls was only 5 percent, and the institutions 
were required to invest almost exclusively in long-term FRMs. 
Beyond the problem of interest rate risk, S&Ls in the late 1970s 
faced credit risk for the first time. Between the end of World War II 
and the 1970s, house prices in the United States rose in almost all 
years across almost all locations. Conventional loans had credit en-
hancements (either relatively low loan-to-value ratios or private mort-
gage insurance), and FHA loans were backed by the full faith and 
credit of the U.S. government. This meant that residential mortgages 
were very safe, as equity or insurance protected against default loss.
The early 1980s, however, brought about nominal house price de-
clines in the Rust Belt. Office of Federal Housing Enterprise Over-
sight (OFHEO) data show that in 1982, house prices fell in Detroit The Housing Finance Revolution  47
by 17 percent and in Flint by 15 percent. Prices in Cleveland fell by 
a small amount over the course of 1982, but neither did nominal 
prices go up much between 1980 and 1984, meaning that borrowers 
accrued little equity just by sitting in their houses.
Defaults rose substantially. S&Ls were prevented from lending be-
yond a very limited geographical area, meaning that they were unable 
to diversify geographically. This combination of events produced a 
broken housing finance system. Mortgage debt outstanding relative 
to personal income fell by 7 percent between 1979 and 1981. In the 
face of this situation, lenders and government officials recognized a 
need to change mortgage loan procedures. While part of the “solu-
tion” to the mortgage finance crisis was the catastrophic Garn-St. 
Germain Act of 1982 (the Act was catastrophic because it postponed 
an effective solution and the problem worsened), part of it was the 
development of a revolution that still reverberates.
Specifically, Congress recognized that ceilings on returns to depos-
its were counterproductive, and passed the Monetary Control Act of 
1980 phasing out Regulation Q. Moreover, the Federal Home Loan 
Bank  Board  recognized  that  depositories  could  protect  themselves 
against interest rate risk by issuing ARMs. The Federal Home Loan 
Bank Board in 1982 gave explicit permission for S&Ls to originate and 
hold ARMs, and the market share of ARMs responded accordingly.
While other countries dismantled their segmented housing finance 
systems and linked housing finance to capital markets through de-
regulated depositories, the U.S. linked housing finance to capital 
markets through depository deregulation and securitization. 
Thrifts restructured their portfolios by exchanging FRMs for MBS 
that could be sold to one of the U.S. secondary market agencies. This 
behavior was encouraged by rules that allowed losses to be amortized 
rather than realized immediately (Wachter, 1990). Thrifts then solved 
their asset liability mismatch going forward by holding in their port-
folios newly available ARMs.
Elsewhere, securitization has not developed in part because the   
“infrastructure  requirements  for  mortgage  security  issuance  are   
demanding, time consuming, and costly” (Chiquier, Hassler, and 48  Richard K. Green and Susan M. Wachter
Lea 2004). The U.S., on the other hand, provided the underpin-
nings for its mortgage security infrastructure with the creation of 
HOLC in 1934 and FNMA in 1938. Freddie Mac invented MBS 
pass-throughs, instruments that passed cash flows from borrowers 
to securities holders, in 1971. The mortgage securities market be-
came increasingly sophisticated as it integrated the tools of modern 
finance, as further discussed below. 
One  of  the  mechanisms  the  government-sponsored  enterprises 
(GSEs)  used  to  create  liquidity  in  the  mortgage  market  was  the 
standardization of mortgage documentation. This documentation 
allowed the GSEs to parsimoniously collect the data necessary to de-
velop robust underwriting models and guaranteed that home mort-
gages within securities would be sufficiently homogeneous that they 
could trade in liquid markets.
These developments allowed 22 years of uninterrupted liquidity in 
the market for conventional conforming mortgages.32 
State of Knowledge
So far as we know, no one applied option pricing theory to mort-
gages before the late 1970s, when Asay (1978) wrote an innovative 
and seminal dissertation. Dunn and McConnell (1981) and Fos-
ter and Van Order (1984) followed with influential papers of their 
own. Yet on reflection, mortgages obviously have lots of optionality 
embedded in them. Borrowers have an option to put houses back 
to lenders through default, and an option to call mortgages back 
from lenders through low-cost refinancing. Black-Scholes modeling 
techniques thus helped investors gain insights into the spreads they   
required in order to be compensated for underlying mortgage risk.
The mortgage market made for a particularly interesting applica-
tion of option pricing theory because borrowers often do not exercise 
optimally. While the frequency of the exercise of both the call and 
put options increases as they get deeper and deeper into the money 
(Foster and Van Order, 1984 and 1985; Kau, Keenan, and Kim, 
1993), households appear to neither default ruthlessly nor prepay op-
timally. With respect to default, many households seemed particularly The Housing Finance Revolution  49
immune to market conditions. Foster and Van Order found that of 
households whose mortgage debt exceeded 110 percent of house value, 
only around 4 percent defaulted. 
Archer and Ling (1993) and Green and Lacour-Little (1999) also 
found that households did not exercise prepayment optimally. In 
fact, in the middle 1990s, many borrowers had mortgages whose 
coupon rates were more than 200 basis points above market rates, 
and yet failed to refinance. Identifying such borrowers became an im-
portant part of mortgage pricing because slow, prepaying, premium 
mortgages were highly profitable. So as mortgages began to be fund-
ed increasingly in capital markets, and as computer power became 
cheaper, investors in mortgages developed sophisticated models of 
default and prepayment behavior. 
Residential borrowers do not (or at least did not) behave in the 
same manner as corporate borrowers, and indeed, may not behave 
in a manner easily explained by any theory of utility maximization.33 
Thus, investors that could identify the characteristics of borrowers 
who did not behave “optimally” gained a considerable advantage 
over others. 
Changing  behavior  and  changing  loan  origination  costs  have, 
however, undermined the ability of econometric models to predict 
prepayment speeds. Borrowers have become much more aggressive in 
the exercise of the call option. Bloomberg data show that the Public 
Securities Administration Conditional Prepayment Rates (CPR) for 
a mortgage with a 100-basis-point spread over market has increased 
by three to four times between 1993 and 2006. In 2005, when mort-
gage interest rates were low, around 40 percent of existing mortgages 
were refinanced in a single year. The instability of models predicting 
prepayment may be a harbinger about how much we can glean about 
future defaults based on past default models.
The Succession to the Revolution: The Terror?
A variety of indicators imply that the housing finance revolution in the 
U.S. has improved efficiency and consumer welfare. Nevertheless, recent 
events suggest that, just as in 1789, a revolution has produced a terror. 50  Richard K. Green and Susan M. Wachter
An important precursor to the subprime crisis was the development 
of the private label MBS market for non-conforming prime mortgag-
es. This market developed in parallel with the Fannie/Freddie secu-
rity structure and allowed for capital market financing of mortgages 
whose balances were larger than that permitted for Fannie/Freddie 
purchase.34 The private label market worked to support growth in se-
curitization of “jumbo” mortgages, just as the Fannie/Freddie agency 
debt supported the growth of prime mortgages, although it was in a 
few ways critically different from the agency market.
Because private label securities have no government backing, im-
plicit or otherwise, the coupon rates on loans backed by such se-
curities are higher than they are in the conforming market. The 
Congressional Budget Office (2004) estimates that borrowers in the 
non-conforming market historically pay a premium of 25 basis points 
relative to borrowers in the conforming market. Green and Wachter 
(2005) note that non-conforming mortgages typically have higher 
down payments and a greater tendency to be ARMs than conform-
ing mortgages, but that could be a result of borrower choice, rather 
than security structure.
The most meaningful way in which private label securities differ 
from agency-backed securities is with respect to structure. Fannie 
and Freddie securities are tranched for prepayment risk, but are gen-
erally not tranched for credit risk. Private label securities are, how-
ever, tranched for credit risk. As a result, early tranches are presumed 
to have virtually no credit risk (particularly in the prime market for 
jumbo loans), while later tranches take on more credit risk, and there-
fore, earn higher expected rates of return. Over the period of the late 
1990s, when house prices were rising and the private label market 
was largely confined to prime mortgages, credit losses on even junior 
tranches remained low.
This all changed recently. The private label market grew dramati-
cally, with issuances rising from $586 billion in 2003 to $1.2 trillion 
in 2005. A large share of the growth came from the subprime and 
Alt-A markets,35 whose share of the private label market grew from 
41 percent to 76 percent over this two-year period (England, 2006).The Housing Finance Revolution  51
The creation of structured finance for mortgage credit risk abetted 
the rise of the subprime market. For a time, capital markets seemed to 
have an appetite for almost any kind of risk, so long as it received suf-
ficiently large yields in exchange. But as we shall discuss below, inves-
tors in junior credit tranches often faced uncertainty, rather than risk. 
Many subprime loans had essentially no underwriting, and insufficient 
data were available to calibrate default risk for subprime mortgages. 
At the heart of the subprime crisis are three basic issues: pricing 
vs. rationing, asymmetric information between lender and borrow-
ers, and asymmetric information between originators and investors. 
While the subprime crisis is too recent to develop formal empirical 
tests of its causes, we can list a set of possible candidates.
Pricing vs. Rationing
One of the truly astonishing transformations of the mortgage mar-
ket has been the increase in the access to mortgage credit. American 
Housing Survey data show that between 1997 and 2005, the number 
of households with a mortgage increased by 20 percent while the 
number of households increased by 9 percent. Nominal mortgage 
debt outstanding grew by 2.5 times over that time period,36 while 
nominal GDP grew by 50 percent.
This  market  growth  was  in  part  a  function  of  more  efficient 
average  cost  pricing  of  credit  or  “rationing”:  Prime  mortgages 
are  now  usually  underwritten  with  logit  models,  and  borrow-
ers  are  either  accepted  or  rejected  based  on  these  logits. Those 
accepted  into  the  pool  pay  the  same  average-cost  price,  with 
the exception of those with loan-to-value ratios in excess of 80   
percent  who  must  pay  mortgage  insurance  premiums.  The   
companies developing these models—Fannie Mae, Freddie Mac, 
Wells Fargo, Citibank, etc.—hire econometric modelers and have 
millions of observations with which to work. Consequently, they 
estimate models with precise coefficient estimates and small residu-
als. These well-estimated models mitigate against adverse selection 
among the pool of borrowers who are deemed to be good credit 
risks. Indeed, econometric underwriting models have shown that 
two  observables—loan-to-value  ratio  and  credit  history—have 52  Richard K. Green and Susan M. Wachter
enormous power in predicting default risk. Lenders have also used   
automation  to  assure  the  integrity  of  both  of  these  measures.   
Automated valuation models (following the pioneering repeat sales 
techniques of Bailey, Muth, and Nourse, 1961, and Case and Shill-
er, 1989) help in monitoring appraisers while attempted tinkering 
with Fair Isaac Credit Scores leads to a reduction in those scores.
As models have become more precise, more borrowers have be-
come eligible to receive prime mortgages. Certain potential borrow-
ers, however, do not qualify for prime mortgages, usually because of 
poor credit history. And so, as these borrowers become pushed out of 
the prime market, lenders have used pricing to bring them into the 
subprime market. Subprime originations increased from 8 percent of 
new loans in 2003 to 22 percent in 2005 (England, 2006).37 Chair-
man Greenspan praised this development, noting:
 “where once marginal applicants would have simply been 
denied credit, lenders are now able to quite efficiently judge the 
risk posed by individuals and price that risk appropriately… 
…Improved access to credit for consumers, and especially 
these more-recent developments, has had significant ben-
efits. Unquestionably, innovation and deregulation have 
vastly expanded credit availability to virtually all income 
classes. Access to credit has enabled families to purchase 
homes, deal with emergencies, and obtain goods and ser-
vices. Home ownership is at a record high, and the number 
of home mortgage loans to low- and moderate-income and 
minority families has risen rapidly over the past five years. 
Credit cards and installment loans are also available to the 
vast majority of households.”38
Risk-based pricing became widespread in the subprime market 
in the late 1990s along with the development of private label secu-
ritization of non-conforming mortgages. But while the algorithms 
for rationing credit became sophisticated, the algorithms for pricing 
subprime mortgages (to the extent such things even exist) faced a 
serious identification problem. From 1997 to 2005, the period in 
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in the United States rose rapidly and nearly ubiquitously. This meant 
that the incentive to default was extremely low—households had a 
strong incentive to sell their houses and preserve their equity rather 
than default. 
At the same time, the subprime market developed new products 
whose features had never faced a market test. In particular, lenders 
introduced 2/28 and 3/27 ARMs with prepayment penalties. These 
mortgages would have introductory teaser rates (for two or three 
years) that would reset to London Interbank Offered Rate or one-
year Treasuries with a large spread. Borrowers would qualify for the 
loan based on the initial teaser rate, and then would be locked into 
the higher rate after the teaser expired.39 
Past research originated in the 1980s on teaser-rate ARMs showed 
that borrowers had a strong propensity to prepay when rates adjusted 
to a market rate of interest plus a large margin (see Green and Shilling, 
1997). These ARMs did not have prepayment penalties, but research 
suggests that borrowers as a group understood the product they were 
getting themselves into: They would take advantage of the teaser and 
then exit the mortgage at the moment when it became profitable for 
the lender. 
Default is a much more serious credit event than prepayment. Yet, it 
should not be too surprising that borrowers would react to a payment 
shock. Indeed, originating this kind of mortgage is almost asking for 
adverse selection: For example, the rational borrower who uses a 2/28 
will take advantage of the ability to live in a house at a below-market 
rate of interest for two years, and will then compare the present value 
of the mortgage relative to the present value of the house at that point. 
Because the mortgage carries a premium interest rate (i.e., a rate whose 
foundation is a large spread over some benchmark), the chances are 
that the mortgage’s value, from the borrower’s perspective, will be 
greater than the value of the asset, and so there will be an incentive 
to default. Once good data are available, it will be useful to observe 
whether 2/28 borrowers—or borrowers of negative amortization and 
optional payment ARMs—default more ruthlessly than others. As it 
is, we know from Federal Reserve data that almost all of the subprime 
delinquency problems arise from ARMs.54  Richard K. Green and Susan M. Wachter
But let us return to the point. The lending industry attempted to 
use pricing to expand the market to borrowers not served by the 
prime market. The mistake the industry apparently made was offer-
ing a loss-leader price in the early years of a loan in order to get bor-
rowers into the market, in hopes that they would make up the dif-
ference in later years. Though mortgage lenders attempted to enforce 
the higher price in the future through use of prepayment penalties, 
prima facie evidence suggests that this did not work.
Asymmetric Information and Adverse Selection: Borrowers and Lenders
Asymmetric information also arises because it is likely that mort-
gage originators understand mortgage pricing and risk better than 
borrowers. To make this concrete, consider the nature of mortgage 
disclosures. The Truth in Lending Act requires that borrowers be in-
formed of the annual percentage rate (APR) on their mortgage. The 
APR is the internal rate of return on a mortgage based on its coupon 
rate, discount points, amortization, and term. The APR calculation 
assumes that borrowers never refinance, and makes no provision for 
fees other than discount points. As such, it does not give an accurate 
picture of mortgage cost. 
Both borrowers and investors in mortgages are interested in yield, 
which is the internal rate of return on a mortgage. But of course, the 
yield is not the same thing as the mortgage coupon rate (the basis on 
which the mortgage amortizes) or the APR (a rate that amortizes the 
cost of discount points over the amortization period of the mortgage). 
The yield is rather the true return/cost of a mortgage. Even in the 
context of an FRM, disclosing effective cost is not straightforward.
Yield comes from six components: the note or coupon rate, dis-
count points (up-front cash a borrower pays to lower the coupon 
rate), fees, prepayment penalties, the life of the mortgage (i.e., how 
long the borrower actually pays the mortgage before refinancing or 
selling it off), and frequency of amortization.The Housing Finance Revolution  55
To give a sense of how these components interact, consider three 
fairly simple mortgages. Mortgage one has a 6 percent fixed rate, no 
points, no fees, 30-year amortization and an expected life of three years. 
Mortgage two has a 4.5 percent fixed rate, two points, 2 percent fees, 
a 2 percent prepayment penalty if prepaid within five years, 30-year 
amortization, and an expected life of three years. Mortgage three is the 
same as mortgage two, except that it has an expected life of ten years. 
The regulatory APR for the three mortgages is 6.16 percent, 4.86 per-
cent, and 4.86 percent, respectively.40
But these APR calculations do not reflect the true cost of the mort-
gages (nor, obviously, do the coupon rates). The true cost of the mort-
gage is a function of how the borrower behaves after the mortgage 
is originated. For example, the borrower of mortgage two decides to 
repay the mortgage after three years. This means that little time has 
passed to amortize points and fees, and that the borrower is subject 
to a prepayment penalty. As a consequence, while both the coupon 
and the APR on this mortgage are lower than the first mortgage, the 
actual cost to the borrower of the second mortgage, at 6.6 percent, is 
higher than the cost of the first mortgage, at 6.16 percent.
Now let us consider the third mortgage. The borrower pays off 
this mortgage in ten years; consequently, enough time passes to sub-
stantially amortize the upfront mortgage costs and to eliminate the 
prepayment penalty. As a consequence, the cost of this mortgage to 
the borrower (4.86 percent) is substantially lower than the cost of the 
first mortgage.
The point of this illustration is to show that it is difficult to charac-
terize exactly what a mortgage price is, and that the price is driven in 
part by the behavior of the borrower after the loan is originated. 
Price revelation is elusive for subprime borrowers (Wachter, 2003).     
This is exacerbated by the lack of a guarantee in pricing at the clos-
ing of all the terms, which adds complexity and reduces transparency. 56  Richard K. Green and Susan M. Wachter
This means that even under the best of circumstances, disclosing true 
costs and risks to even well-informed borrowers is difficult; to a bor-
rower without financial literacy, it is nearly impossible.
Asymmetric Information and Adverse Selection: Originators  
and Investors
The subprime crisis has revealed a number of puzzling aspects 
about investor behavior with respect to (1) the relationship between 
investors in securities and loan originators, (2) the nature of diversifi-
cation, and (3) investor understanding about housing market risk.
The behavior of investors with respect to subprime mortgages is 
puzzling, to say the least. Mortgage originators had powerful incen-
tives to originate loans, regardless of quality: Every mortgage that was 
successfully originated and sold to an investor produced a fee for the 
originator. While companies originating the loan, such as New Cen-
tury, could give representations and warranties to investors that loans 
met some minimum standard, they were not capitalized well enough 
to make good on any promises in the event of large-scale default. It is 
difficult to understand why this was not clear to investors ex ante.
The second puzzle is that investors and rating agencies appeared to 
believe that diversification per se could cause systematic risk to disap-
pear. It is of course the case that as a security becomes more diversified, 
unsystematic risk will become smaller, but mortgages with 10 percent 
default probabilities will continue to carry such probabilities, regard-
less of the securities in which they are packaged (Coval et al., 2007). 
The third puzzle is investors’ seeming lack of understanding about 
housing  market  risk.  Commentary  in  the  popular  press  could  be 
schizophrenic about potential risks in the housing market. On the one 
hand, stories about a potential housing bubble in the United States 
date back to at least 2002.41 On the other hand, Fannie Mae and Fred-
die Mac came under severe criticism for having high current returns on 
equity in their guarantee business. The Fannie and Freddie guarantee 
business collects fees from holders of MBS in exchange for guarantee-
ing timely payment of principal and interest. Implicit in the criticism The Housing Finance Revolution  57
of Fannie and Freddie was a charge that the fees they collected were 
“too high” in light of how rare default and foreclosure were.
Indeed, Fannie and Freddie had credit losses of a basis point or less 
in every year between 1999 and 2004.42 The reason for this is that 
house prices rose smartly and ubiquitously over this period of time. 
In past periods, however, when house prices fell in various regions of 
the country—such as in the upper Midwest in the 1970s, in the Old 
Patch in the 1980s, and on the coasts in the 1990s—default costs 
were considerably higher. In fact, some FHA cohorts from the 1980s 
had a default rate of more than 19 percent (Capone, 2000). It is not 
clear what history of house prices investors were relying on when 
they decided the yields they received were acceptable in exchange for 
the risks they were taking on. 
The Wall Street Journal reported (August 15, 2007) that rating 
agencies chose not to change the ratings of MBS which were more 
liberally underwritten until they actually began to fail. Moreover, 
when investors mis-price risk, the result is the artificial inflation of 
housing prices. The pricing boom of 2006 was likely in part due to 
this unsustainable credit boom (Pavlov and Wachter, 2007a).
A theme across all these puzzles is the lack of transparency, which 
in turn led agents to make uninformed decisions.
Conclusion
We take away three lessons from our observations on the housing 
finance revolution. First, mortgage markets that are linked to capital 
markets are better for consumers and investors than are mortgage 
systems where the price and allocation of mortgages is determined 
by government. 
Second, there are countries that do not have access to long-term 
capital and therefore do not have fully functioning mortgage mar-
kets. The development of such markets would allow borrower ac-
cess to mortgages with long terms. Nonetheless, among the alternate   
vehicles of depositories, covered bonds, and securitization, it is not 
at all clear whether there is a “best” channel for attaching mortgages 
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To some extent, the policy issue with respect to channels is de-
termining where risk is best managed. Depositories manage interest 
rate risk by having such assets as adjustable-rate mortgages. But if 
households only have ARMs available to them, they must balance 
their long-duration asset—their house—against a short-duration li-
ability. This can expose homeowners to mortgage payment shocks 
and thereby induce macroeconomic instability. 
On the other hand, the U.S. MBS structure gives borrowers access 
to fixed rates over long terms as well as the option of prepayment. 
This means holders of MBS are exposed to interest rate risk regard-
less of how rates move: They take capital losses when rates rise and 
they must reinvest in securities with lower interest rates at par when 
rates fall. While investors in agency MBS take on substantial interest 
rate risk, they do not take on much credit risk, which is instead born 
by the GSE intermediaries—Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac. The rela-
tively low spreads on Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac securities imply 
that investors either have a great deal of confidence in their ability 
to manage credit risk, or confidence in the amorphous relationship 
between the GSEs and the federal government. A key issue is the re-
lationship between the government and the GSEs which has allowed 
Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac to develop and maintain uniform un-
derwriting instruments, which in turn has produced homogenous 
mortgages that can easily be bundled into liquid securities. 
Finally, the German covered bond system divides risk between in-
vestors and borrowers differently. Mortgages in Germany have long 
terms, but carry less market rate risk relative to American MBS for 
investors because borrowers are effectively prevented from prepaying 
their mortgages. German mortgages which are funded with covered 
bonds are also heavily over-collateralized and, consequently, carry 
little credit risk. Borrowers, on the other hand, are faced with large 
prepayment penalties should they wish to refinance or even sell their 
house, but have the benefit of knowing that their payments are fixed 
for a long period.
The current U.S. crisis is centered in the private label securitization 
market and is driven by the uncertainty of credit outcomes in sub-
prime and jumbo MBS. As a result of the crisis, bank originators of The Housing Finance Revolution  59
these loans may need to provide additional information on balance 
sheet funding. If banks fund these mortgages on balance sheets, they 
will face additional interest rate risk (unless either only short-term 
maturities are offered or prepayment is sharply curtailed), as well as 
credit risk. 
Third,  underwriting  is  necessary.  No  amount  of  sophisticated 
structured finance can overcome the lack of sound underwriting. In-
deed the complexity of structural finance vehicles limits their trading 
and the revelation of the market price of risk. Moreover the absence 
of underwriting means investors face uncertainty, rather than risk, 
making informed investor choice impossible. 60  Richard K. Green and Susan M. Wachter
Endnotes
1MBS were also introduced in the latter half of the decade (a development first 
introduced in the United States). Securitization of mortgage pools has been accom-
panied by increased borrower access to longer-term mortgages. To date however, 
variable-rate mortgages predominate. 
2For further discussion, please see Flanagan and Reardon (2002, p3).
3For further discussion, please see Dübel (1996).
4Germany primarily uses covered bonds to finance mortgages. The German sys-
tem is funded both by commercial banks via deposits and by covered mortgage 
bonds directly funded via capital markets, with heavy restrictions on prepayment 
to limit the banks’ interest rate risk. The bonds are structured in such a way that 
they largely keep risk with borrowers: The mortgages funded by the bonds are 
tightly underwritten and generally have substantial prepayment penalties. 
5See Kim (2000) for an excellent discussion of deregulation of housing and in-
frastructure finance in Asia.
6The countries covered are Spain (ES), Ireland (IE), the United Kingdom (UK), 
the Netherlands (NL), Belgium (BE), the United States (US), Japan (JP), France 
(FR), Canada (CA), Italy (IT), Australia (AU), Sweden (SE), and Germany (DE).   
The data on Korea is based on housing price index compiled by Kookmin Bank. 
Data are not available for all countries for all years. The source interest rate data is 
Economy.com and for price indexes is BIS (see Kim and Wachter, 2004).
7Interest rate declines have continued, across many economies, even with ris-
ing gross domestic product (GDP) growth rates in recent years. While declines 
in interest rates are to be expected with declining GDP growth rates of 2001, it is 
notable that the decline in rates continued even as world GDP growth resumed at 
high levels.  
8The Granger tests are with one lag only, because we have small numbers of 
degrees of freedom.
9For further discussion of the impact of the declining interest rates on housing 
prices, see Kim and Wachter.
10See Green, Malpezzi, and Mayo (2005) and Glaeser, Gyourko, and Saks (2005).
11Housing is less affordable throughout the industrialized world than it is in most 
of the U.S. And while mortgage rate declines (and increased access to mortgage 
financing) have increased affordability in many markets, elsewhere, prices have in-
creased more than interest rates have declined (in part due to other exogenous de-
mand shifters). This shift is partly due to the improved access to mortgages, which 
increases demand from segments of the population who previously did not have 
access to financing. Ireland stands as a prime example of this phenomenon (Second The Housing Finance Revolution  61
Annual Demographia International Housing Affordability Survey, 2006). 
12A report in the Daily Express this week revealed that FRMs will cost the aver-
age borrower at least £165 a month extra. Gordon Brown cited housing volatility 
as a key barrier to euro entry in June in his five tests speech and announced a 
push towards FRMs as an attempt to combat this volatility.  The research in the 
Daily Express reveals however that FRMs are unlikely to be popular. Simon Tyler of 
independent adviser Chase de Vere Mortgage Management said “they (fixed-rate 
mortgages) are never the cheapest deals on the market, so they will probably never 
be the most popular” (Daily Express, 18 November).
13For further discussion, please see Green, Mariano, Pavlov, and Wachter (2007). 
14A specific set of policy prescriptions considered to constitute a “standard” re-
form package promoted for crisis-wracked countries by Washington-based institu-
tions. It is broadly associated with expanding the role of market forces and con-
straining the role of the state.
15In addition, in Korea a unique informal housing finance system, Chan Sei, 
developed. Households put up money for apartments for a fixed term which allows 
the owners of the apartment building to finance the dwellings. Green interviewed 
officers of both IDLC and BRACK while on a World Bank mission in May 2004.
16See Renaud (1988) and Struyk and Turner (1986) for excellent descriptions of 
the Korean housing finance system.
17See Kim (2001).
18We don’t want to make too much of this difference, as there are other profound 
differences between the two countries’ housing markets.  But the fact that the Brit-
ish system is funded by banks has not seemed to retard the access of homebuyers 
to reasonably priced mortgage capital.
19The foundation of this material is discussion at the EASE NBER Conference, 
June 2007, as well as Battellino (2004) and Bailey, Davies, and Smith (2004).
20ABS data are available from Reserve Bank of Australia Bulletin Table B19 Secu-
ritization Vehicles (http://www.rba.gov.au/Statistics/Bulletin/index.html).
21The negative interest margins in the late 1980s are partly explained by: hous-
ing interest rates being capped until 1986 and the government’s announcement 
in 1988 that statutory reserve requirements would be phased out, with the banks 
agreeing to the quid pro quo that the savings be translated into lower lending rates 
(Gizycki and Lowe, 2000).
22Managed Funds data are available from Reserve Bank of Australia Bulletin Ta-
ble B18 Managed Funds (http://www.rba.gov.au/Statistics/Bulletin/index.html).
23At the same time, long-term savings vehicles, such as pension funds, were better 62  Richard K. Green and Susan M. Wachter
suited for investment in long-term assets, such as securitized long-term mortgages.
24Commercial banking industry was not nearly as affected since, unlike S&Ls which 
by statute invested in mortgages, banks were able to invest in a variety of assets. For a 
discussion of the S&L crisis and its aftermath, see Bentson and Kaufman (1997). 
25The legislation that allowed adjustable-rate mortgages and eliminated interest 
rate ceilings for S&L banks was the St. Germain Depository Institutions Act of 
1982. Specifically, Title VIII—the “Alternative Mortgage Transaction Parity Act of 
1982” Sec.803 (A) “in which the interest rate or finance charge may be adjusted 
or renegotiated.”
26This statement is based on a conversation with Eugene Skaggs, who was Executive 
Vice President for equity investment for the Northwest Mutual Life Insurance Company.
27Particularly since they were insured by the Federal Housing Administration.
28Deposits initially insured up to $2,500; they are now insured up to $100,000.
29Thanks to both FSLIC and the Federal Home Loan Bank system.
30As we shall discuss later, the regulatory climate, as interpreted by the Federal 
Home Loan Bank Board, was at least partially responsible for this ubiquity in 
fixed-rate loans. 
31A separate motivation was to move debt off of the government balance sheet in 
a time of rising government expenditure.
32Conventional mortgages are those not backed by the full faith and credit of the 
U.S. government. Conforming mortgages are those eligible for purchase by Fannie 
Mae and Freddie Mac.
33Kau, Keenan, and Kim (1994) dispute this, arguing that both rational and “ir-
rational” behavior could be observationally equivalent to each other.    
34Every year, the OFHEO uses a formula based on house prices to determine 
the maximum-sized loan that Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac may purchase. This is 
known as the “conforming loan limit.”
35Alt-A loans are those whose credit characteristics fall in between prime and 
subprime mortgages. 
36Federal Reserve Bulletin, Table 1.54.
37Additional growth including more aggressive negatively amortizing mortgages 
occurred in 2006 (Pavlov and Wachter, 2007a).The Housing Finance Revolution  63
38See remarks by Chairman Alan Greenspan at the Federal Reserve System’s 
Fourth  Annual  Community  Affairs  Research  Conference,  Washington,  D.C., 
April 8, 2005. The ellipsis is used for brevity: The remarks within the ellipsis 
emphasize  that  consumer  worries  about  the  use  of  technology  for  underwrit-
ing are largely misplaced. Available at http://www.federalreserve.gov/boarddocs/
speeches/2005/20050408/default.htm.
39Pavlov and Wachter (2007a) show how prices increased specifically in markets 
where subprime’s market share grew, so that a portion of the price increases were 
credit induced rather than based on fundamentals. 
40APR assumes that discount points are amortized over the term of the loan.   
Fees and prepayment penalties are not included in APR.
41See, for example, Erin Schulte (2002). 
42See OFHEO (2006).64  Richard K. Green and Susan M. Wachter
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